Abstract. In a famous paper of Crypto'01, Boneh and Franklin proposed the first identity-based encryption scheme (IBE), around fifteen years after the concept was introduced by Shamir. Their scheme security (more precisely, the notion of resistance against an IND-ID-CCA attacker) relies in the random oracle model. However, the reduction is far from being tight, and notably depends on the number of extractions queries. In this paper, we present an efficient modification to the Boneh-Franklin scheme that provides a tight reduction. Our scheme is basically an IBE under two keys, one of which is (randomly) detained by the recipient. It can be viewed as a continuation of an idea introduced by Katz and Wang; we will however show how our construction improves this last scheme. Our scheme features a tight reduction to the list bilinear Diffie-Hellman (LBDH) problem, which can be itself reduced tightly either to the gap bilinear Diffie-Hellman (GBDH) or the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problems. Furthermore, for a relaxed notion of tightness (called weak-tightness) that we introduce and discuss in our paper, we show that there is a weakly tight reduction from our scheme to the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman (CBDH) problem. Our scheme is very efficient, as one can precompute most of the quantity involved in the encryption process. Furthermore, the ciphertext size is very short: for proposed parameters, they are |M | + 330 bits long.
Introduction
Identity Based Encryption (IBE) provides a public key encryption mechanism where an arbitrary string, such as recipient's identity, can be served as a public key. The ability to use identities as public keys avoids the need to distribute public key certificates. Such a scheme is largely motivated by many applications such as to encrypt emails using recipient's email address or to encrypt messages for users that have not their proper key at the given moment.
Although the concept of identity based encryption was proposed two decades ago [14] , it is only recently that the first fully functional schemes were proposed. Boneh and Franklin [3, 4] defined a security model namely IND-ID-CCA and gave the first efficient construction provably secure in the random oracle model based on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem. A few years after, new schemes were shown to be secure without random oracles, but in a weaker model of security known as "Selective-ID" model [5, 1] . Such schemes in this weaker model are known to be secure also in the sense of IND-ID-CCA, but the proofs use an inefficient security reduction [1] , which degrades reduction costs by a factor of the size of identities' space, which is indeed not polynomial in the security parameter. Boneh and Boyen [2] subsequently proposed the first scheme which is provably secure in the sense of IND-ID-CCA with a polynomial time reduction in the absence of random oracles, which was then simplified and improved by Waters [17] .
However, for each of the above schemes, the security as in the sense of IND-ID-CCA is reduced only loosely to its underlying intractability assumption. An inefficient security reduction would imply either a lower security level or the requirement of larger key and ciphertext sizes to obtain the same security level.
It has been an open problem (as already posed in [17, 7] ) whether efficient IBE systems can exist with their security in the sense of IND-ID-CCA being reduced tightly (i.e., the factor between the difficulty of the underlying problem and the security of the scheme being only a constant term, as close to 1 as possible) to some reasonable intractability assumption. In the standard model, this problem is still open.
In the random oracle model, however, it has been partially solved by Katz and Wang [10] . However, their idea was just mentioned at the end of one of their papers and regarding a different subject, i.e., the signature schemes, and so, some thoughts were let to the reader.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we remind identity-based encryption schemes of Boneh and Franklin, and of Katz and Wang. We show notably how the Katz and Wang solution does not achieve tight IND-ID-CCA security, even when used with the generic Fujisaki-Okamoto [6] transform. Then, we present our principle result, which is a new IBE scheme with a tight reduction to the list bilinear Diffie-Hellman (LBDH) problem. We also show how this problem can itself be tightly reduced to the gap bilinear Diffie-Hellman (GBDH) problem or the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem. Another point that we address is a relaxed definition of tightness (called weak-tightness), that we introduce and discuss; we then show that there is a weakly-tight reduction from our scheme to the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman (CBDH) problem.
Our scheme is very efficient, as one can precompute most of the quantity during the encryption process, before knowing the message. Furthermore, the ciphertext size is very short: for proposed parameters, they are |M | + 330 bit long, which is comparable with the Boneh-Franklin IBE (whose ciphertexts are |M | + 250 bit long, for a loose reduction).
Outlines. Our paper is organized as follows: we begin in Section 2 with some definitions. Then, in Section 3, we remind the idea of Katz and Wang (which is itself a variant of the Boneh-Franklin IBE), and show how it allows a tight reduction from IND-ID-CPA attackers. However, we point out that without any additional construction step, the reduction does not succeed against IND-ID-CCA attackers. In Section 4, we introduce our new identity-based encryption scheme, and show how it achieves IND-ID-CCA security, with tight reduction. In Section 5, we show in fact our scheme is weakly reducible (more precise discussion given later) to the CBDH problem. In Section 6, we compare our scheme with existing ones. Finally, we conclude our work.
Definitions
We review the model and the security notion of an IBE scheme, the lengthpreserving IND-CCA symmetric key encryption, as well as the definitions of bilinear maps and related problems. We also discuss two flavors of tightness.
ID-Based Encryption
An IBE scheme E consists of four polynomial-time algorithms:
Setup: takes a security parameter k and returns params (system parameters) and master-key. The system parameters include a description of a finite message space M, and a description of a finite ciphertext space C. Intuitively, the system parameters will be publicly known, while the master-key will be known only to the private key generator. Extract: takes as input params, master-key, and an arbitrary ID ∈ {0, 1} * , and returns a private key sk. Here ID is an arbitrary string that will be used as a public key, and sk is the corresponding private decryption key. The Extract algorithm extracts a private key from the given public key. Encrypt: takes as input params, ID, and M ∈ M. It returns a ciphertext C ∈ C. Decrypt: takes as input params, C ∈ C, and a private key sk. It returns M ∈ M or "reject", which is a special symbol not in M.
These algorithms must satisfy the standard consistency constraint; that is, if (params, master-key, M, C) ← Setup(1 k ), then for all M ∈ M and for all ID, M = Decrypt(params, Encrypt(params, ID, M ), Extract(params, master-key, ID)).
Security Notion. The strongest security definition for IBE is chosen ciphertext security for IBE under a chosen identity attack (IND-ID-CCA) [3, 4] . In this model, the adversaries are allowed to collude (chosen ID attack) and to access a decryption oracle. We first review the IND-ID-CCA game:
Setup: The challenger takes a security parameter k and runs the Setup algorithm. It gives the adversary the resulting system parameters params. It keeps the master-key to itself. 
and its running time is at most t. We say that an IBE scheme E is ( , t)-IND-ID-CCA secure if there exists no ( , t)-IND-ID-CCA adversary.
Bilinear Maps
We briefly review several facts about bilinear maps. Throughout this paper, we let G 1 and G 2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order q and g be a generator of G 1 . A bilinear map e :
There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v) for any u, v ∈ G 1 .
Underlying Hard Problems
We review hard problems related to bilinear maps which are those variants of bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problems: the computational BDH (CBDH) [3] , the list BDH (LBDH), the decisional BDH (DBDH) [5] , and the gap BDH (GBDH) [12] problems.
CBDH and LBDH Problems. The -LBDH problem is defined as follows:
abc . Especially, 1-LBDH problem is referred to as the CBDH problem. We say that A is a ( , t)--LBDH algorithm if it runs with time at most t and outputs a list L of length at most which contains T = e(g, g) abc with probability at least , that is,
where |L| denotes the number of elements of L and the probability is taken over the random choice of generator g ∈ G * 1 , the random choice of a, b, c ∈ Z q , and random coins consumed by A.
DBDH Problem. The DBDH problem is defined as follows: given a tuple
as input, outputs a bit β ∈ {0, 1}. We say that A is a ( , t)-DBDH algorithm if it runs with time at most t, and distinguishes the BDH-tuple with advantage at least , that is,
where the probability is taken over the random choice of generator g ∈ G * 1 , the random choice of a, b, c ∈ Z q , the random choice of T in G 2 , and the random coins consumed by A.
GBDH Problem. The GBDH problem is defined as follows: given a tuple g) abc , or "false" otherwise [12] . We say that A is a ( , t)-GBDH algorithm if it runs with time at most t and succeeds in outputting e (g, g) abc with probability at least , that is,
where the probability is taken over the random choice of generator g ∈ G We will use a length preserving IND-CCA-secure SKE in our construction. ‡ Such a scheme can be built, for example, by applying CMC [8] or EME [9] mode of operation to a block cipher, if the underlying block cipher is modeled as (strong) pseudorandom permutation, e.g. AES. Though the above formulation of IND-CCA security differs from that of [8] , one can show by some standard arguments that it is implied by the definition given in [8] .
On the Notions of Tight Reduction
Informally, we say that the security of a scheme can be reduced to an underlying problem tightly in the conventional sense if, there exists a t B -time algorithm B who can solve the underlying problem with the probability B when there exists a t A -time adversary A who can break the scheme with the probability A , where both A B and t A t B hold. In addition to such conventional definition of tightness, we also propose a definition of relaxed tightness. We say that the security of a scheme can be reduced to an underlying problem tightly in the weak sense if, there exists a t B -time algorithm B who can solve the underlying problem with the probability B when there exists a t A -time adversary A who can break the scheme with the probability A , where t B /e B t A / A holds. If this condition holds, we have that the expected running time of A is roughly the same as B. This is the intuition as to why we consider this kind of reduction as weakly tight. Similar notion was also considered by Pointcheval and Stern in [13] .
In this paper, our main result shows that the security of our scheme can be reduced tightly in the conventional sense to standard hard problems, namely, the LBDH problem, and also to the GBDH problem and the DBDH problem. As an independent interest, we also show a tight reduction from the LBDH problem to the CBDH problem in the weak sense. Thus the security of our scheme can be tightly reduced to the problem (also in the weak sense). This observation brings more confidence to the security of our scheme.
Boneh-Franklin IBE and Its Katz-Wang Variant
In this section, we remind the construction of Boneh and Franklin, and its variant by Katz and Wang.
Boneh-Franklin Identity Based Encryption
The Boneh-Franklin [3, 4] ID-based encryption scheme (more precisely, its basic variant) is defined in Table 1 . In Tables 1 and 2 , M denotes a plaintext, G :
n and H : {0, 1} * → G 1 denote random oracles. We refer to [3, 4] for a more precise study of its security. In this subsection, we just remind that the basic version of the Boneh-Franklin IBE is IND-ID-CPA secure, while using Fujisaki-Okamoto [6] transform, one gets the full version of the Boneh-Franklin IBE, which is IND-ID-CCA secure. All these reductions are in the random oracle model.
e, n, g, g pub , G, H master-key := s return (params, master-key)
Extract (ID, params, master-key): Unfortunately, the reduction of the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme is very loose, as there is a factor equal to the number of extract queries that an attacker can make, between the security of the underlying problem (i.e., the CBDH) and the security of the scheme. Roughly, this factor is due to the fact that the reduction must guess which of the identity will be used in the challenge, as for this special identity, it must return a special H output, while for other identities, it must return another type of H output, to be able to answer extract queries.
Katz and Wang's Variant of Boneh-Franklin IBE
This problem of tightness of IBE has been partially solved by Katz and Wang, at the end of a paper [10] whose subject was quite different. Hence, these authors only gave few points of their ideas, and let the rest to the reader. In this subsection, we explain what we believe that Katz and Wang meant, even if we might be subject to errors in the interpretation.
Katz and Wang proposed that, for each identity, there should be two corresponding public keys: instead of using H(ID) as in the Boneh-Franklin, they proposed to use both H (ID, 0) and H(ID, 1) . However, only one of the corresponding private key is known to the designator. With this trick, the reduction does not need to guess which of the identity will be used in the challenge: for each identity, one of the two hash output (let say the one with bit b ID ) is controlled in order the simulator to be able to answer to extract queries, while the other is let to be used in case the identity is the one that appears in the challenge. Hence, for the identity ID of the challenge, if the bit b ID is absolutely indistinguishable to the attacker, with a chance of one half, H(ID ,b ID ) will be used by the attacker and the simulator will succeed in solving the underlying problem.
More precisely, the idea of Katz and Wang is depicted in the Table 2 .
The Katz-Wang Identity Based Encryption
return M † Extract first checks to see if sk ID has been generated before. If it has, the previouslygenerated sk ID is output. A disadvantage of this scheme is its cost: roughly, the Katz-Wang IBE ciphertexts are twice as much as in the Boneh-Franklin IBE, and the encryption process is twice longer (i.e., two exponentiations and two pairing computations).
From [10] , the security of this scheme against IND-ID-CPA can be tightly reduced to the Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. Unfortunately, the use of Fujisaki-Okamoto [6] transform for this scheme is unclear. Katz and Wang did not explain how to achieve a tight IND-ID-CCA security with their scheme.
More precisely, to achieve ID-CCA security (either OW-ID-CCA or IND-ID-CCA), it is necessary that during the decryption, the user can test the equality of the messages in the two parts of the ciphertext. Else, the adversary would get a challenge C = u 0 , V 0 , u 1 , V 1 (of a message M that he wants to recover), and create another valid ciphertext
depending on a random bit b: for this, he takes a random message M 2 , picks r 2 ← Z * q , and computes w 2 = e(g pub , h ID,b ) r 2 , u 2 = g r 2 and v 2 = G(w 2 ) ⊕ M 2 . With overwhelming probability, M 2 is not equal to M . Then, by querying the decryption of C b to the simulator or the legitimate user, with probability 1 2 , the adversary would learn the message M .
We now conclude the above discussion. On one hand, the technique of double encryption in which exactly one key for each ID is known by the simulator enables the simulation of the key exposure oracle and results in tight security reduction. On the other hand, this very technique itself also allows the CCA adversary to successfully break the scheme.
§ This contradictory implication of straightforward application of the Katz-Wang technique suggests that more sophisticated techniques are needed.
In our scheme, we propose a solution to these problems: namely, our scheme features a tight IND-ID-CCA security; furthermore, our scheme is roughly as efficient as the Boneh-Franklin scheme in term of ciphertext size, and in term of encryption and decryption timing. Our scheme is the subject of the next section.
Our IBE Scheme

Proposed Scheme (TightIBE)
Let k be a given security parameter. Let G 1 and G 2 be two groups of order q (which is a k-bit prime number) and g be a generator of G 1 . Let e : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear map. Let E = (Enc, Dec) be a SKE that the key space is K and the message space is M. Let G, H,Ĥ be cryptographic hash functions G : {0,
The TightIBE scheme consists of the four algorithms which are shown in Table 3 
where, τ is the maximum time among times for computing an exponentiation in G 1 , G 2 and pairing e, and τ is the time for responding to anĤ-query.
Proof. The proof is provided by a sequence of games. Let (g,
be a random instance of the LBDH problem, for which we do not know a, b, c.
g, g pub , G, H,Ĥ master-key := s return (params, master-key)
Extract
† (ID, params, master-key):
return M † Extract first checks to see if sk ID has been generated before. If it has, the previouslygenerated sk ID is output. Game G 1 : In this game, one makes classical simulation of the random oracles, with random answers for any new query, as shown in Figure 1 . Moreover, it maintains the evaluation of b ID for each ID by randomly choosing from {0, 1} for the first-time evaluation and using the same value after that. This game is clearly identical to the previous one, hence Pr[
Game G 2 : In this game, we change the simulation of the H-oracle: Rule Extract
Decryption-Oracle
Query Decrypt(ID, u, V 0 , V 1 , α): the answer M is defined by the following rules. First get the secret key d ID by using Extract rule.
Rule Decrypt-Exception
Do nothing.
Then compute:
Challenge
For two messages (M 0 , M 1 ) and identity ID , flip a coin β and set M = M β , choose randomly R ∈ {0, 1} k 1 , and then answer (u , V 0 , V 1 , α ) where
Rule Chal-DEM-Enc We now analyze the correctness. Let h = e(g, g) (a generator in G 2 ). Precisely, we want a lower bound the probability of the following event:
∃ (r, s, u, v) 
We first claim that the event ∃(r, u) t r,u = h abc is exactly the event that the LBDH algorithm succeeds at least once (namely, the r-th run). This is since, due to Eq. (2) To maximize this lower bound, we will choose N as large as possible since it tends to its maximum, 1 − 2e −1 (where e is the base of natural logarithm), as N → ∞. However, for simplicity, choosing N = 2 is sufficient for our purpose. Therefore h( ) ≥ 1/4 and the the probability bound in the lemma statement holds.
